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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : SUPREME COURT 
CASE NO. 
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, : 
Court of Appeals 
v. : Case No. 920031-CA 
JAMES FRANK WILCOX, : District Court No. 911900621 
DEFENDANT/PETITIONER. : PRIORITY NO. 11 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the affidavit in support of the search warrant 
prepared in this case contain materially false misstatements, 
misrepresentations and/or omissions such that the warrant was 
incorrectly issued in the case without probable cause and in 
violation of state and federal constitutional strictures? 
2. Did the trial court abdicate its obligations under 
state and federal constitutions in refusing to have an evidentiary 
hearing to determine whether a violation of Franks v. Delaware 
and/or State v. Nielson occurred on the facts of this case? 
3. Did the trial court improperly deny Mr. Wilcox's 
motion that the issuance of a night time, no knock search warrant 
violated state and federal constitutional provisions because the 
affidavit in support of the warrant was without sufficient factual 
information to support the requisite finding of probable cause? 
4. Did the trial court improperly conclude, without 
beneift of an evidentiary hearing and/or briefing and argument, that 
Mr. Wilcox's motion to discover the identity of the confidential 
informant did not violate his rights under the state and federal 
constitutions? 
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ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
On the sixth day of February, 1992, a panel of the 
Utah Court of Appeals considered Mr. Wilcox,s Petition for 
Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order earlier timely 
filed with that court and denied the same in a two to one (2 to 1) 
vote, Judges Greenwood and Bench voting to deny the petition while 
Judge Orme dissented from the decision to deny the writ. (See 
Addendum A for a copy of the Court of Appeal's Order denying the 
peititon.) 
Mr. Wilcox insists that the Utah Court of Appeals 
erred in denying the petition and urges this Court to correct that 
error and to grant permission for him to be heard on the writ of 
certiorari. 
JURISDICTION 
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
clarifies that an order of the court of appeals may be reviewed by 
the Court through the mechanism of petitioning for a writ of 
certiorari. Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) (1953 as amended) 
specifically confers on this Court discretionary appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over 
judgments of the Utah Court of Appeals. On February 6, 1992, a 
panel of the Utah Court of Appeals entered an order denying Mr. 
Wilcox's Petition for Permission to file an Interlocutory Appeal. 
2 
One of the three judges of that panel dissented from the denial of 
the petition. This petition for writ of certiorari is filed within 
the time constraints established by statute. Rule 48, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure (April 1, 1990) . 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution 
Article I, § 14; Constitution of Utah 
Rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1989) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. James Frank Wilcox is charged by Information with 
one count of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with 
Intent to Distribute, a second degree felony in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1953 as amended), and one count of 
Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1953 as amended). 
Both charges stem from evidence consisting of cocaine and money 
seized at the residence and on the person of Mr. Wilcox pursuant to 
service of a search warrant on his residence. 
Mr. Wilcox filed pre-trial motions (1) to suppress the 
evidence challenging the propriety and sufficiency of the search 
warrant, the accompanying affidavit in support of the warrant, and 
it's "night-time/no knock entitlement11 (see Addendum B for copy of 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress), and (2) to discover the identity of 
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confidential informants listed in the affidavit in support of the 
search warrant to assure a fair determination of the issues in the 
case. (See Addendum C for copy of Defendant's Motion to Discover 
the Identity of Confidential Informant.) The trial court denied 
both motions, without permitting evidentiary hearings. 
A petition for permission to appeal from an 
interlocutory order was then filed with the Utah Court of Appeals. 
A panel of that court, voting two to one (2 to 1), denied that 
petition. (See Addendum A for copy of Order from court of appeals 
denying the petition.) This Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
followed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
James Frank Wilcox, charged with Unlawful Possession 
of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second degree 
felony, and Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third 
degree felony, filed two pretrial motions with the district court 
requesting (1) that evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant be 
suppressed because the evidence was seized by authority of a search 
warrant issued without probable cause and without justification of a 
"night time/no knock11 entitlement. (see Addendum B for copy of 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress), and (2) that the identity of 
confidential informants listed in the affidavit in support of the 
search warrant must be revealed to assure a fair determination of 
the issues in the case, in particular the suppression issues (see 
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Addendum C for copy of Defendant's Motion to Discover the Identity 
of Confidential Informant). 
At the scheduled evidentiary hearing on the motions 
the State presented a Motion to Strike the hearing alleging failure 
of the defense to provide "an offer of proof, including affidavits 
or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses or a 
satisfactory explanation of their absence" (see Addendum D for a 
copy of State's Motion to Strike). The district court heard 
argument on the State's Motion to Strike including a proffer from 
the defense as to the specific insufficiencies of the warrant and 
identifying other purported false and misleading information 
contained therein. The court would not permit the scheduled 
evidentiary hearing on the motions to go forward indicating his 
liklihood of granting the State's motion, but on the request of 
defense counsel permitted briefing on the matter before making the 
decision. 
Mr. Wilcox then filed with the district court a Memorandum 
in Support of Defendant's Objection to State's Motion to Strike 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress (see Addendum E). Mr. Wilcox 
specifically articulated his objections to the search warrant and 
the accompanying affidavit in support of the warrant. Mr. Wilcox 
also detailed both federal and state constitutional arguments in 
support of the motion to suppress and in support of an evidentiary 
hearing to obtain testimony regarding the alleged false statements 
and misrepresentations contained in the affidavit and the warrant. 
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(See Addendum E, pages 3-15) Mr. Wilcox identified with specificity 
five numbered situations which render the warrant deficient of 
probable cause because of the false and misleading nature of the 
affiant's information. In abbreviated form they are as follows: 
(1) The affiant labeled several alleged drug purchases from 
the Wilcox premises as "controlled buys11 when the buys were 
not controlled and the location of the buys determined only 
by speculation. While the control is placed on the c.i., 
that control is lost when another person enters the 
transaction without being searched or surveiled. 
For example, three such buys are identified where the 
affiant admits to conducting a pre-search of the 
confidential informant (flc.i.ff) but on the way to the 
residence the c.i. stops at a different location to pick up 
another individual, described as an "unwitting individual!! 
("u.i"). The u.i. gets in the c.i.'s car and is driven 
near the Wilcox residence and let out to supposedly enter 
the Wilcox residence without the c.i. to make a drug 
purchase on behalf of the c.i. This u.i. later returns to 
the c.i.'s car who first drops off the u.i. where u.i. was 
initially picked up before the c.i. returns alone to the 
affiant for a post-buy search. (See pages 6-8 of Addendum 
E, Defendant's Memorandum, for more detail of the concerns 
of each of these buys.) These facts contained in the 
affidavit contradict the alleged "contolled" nature of 
these buys thereby illustrating materially false and 
misleading information was presented to the magistrate to 
obtain the search warrant. 
(2) Affiant designates his c.i. in this case by routinely 
refering to him/her as the "confidential reliable 
informant" ("c.r.i."). The term "reliable" is not 
supported by any information provided within the 
affidavit. While the affiant does note that the c.r.i. has 
given statements against interest, no information is 
provided regarding any such statements nor is an 
explanation of any kind presented to support the conclusion 
that the c.r.i. is, in fact, reliable. (See pages 8-9 of 
Addendum E, Defendant's Memorandum for additional detail of 
this complaint.) Identifying the confidential informant, 
on whom the case hinges, as reliable without sufficient 
support to form an indicia of reliability is at best a 
material omission and at worst presenting a magistrate with 
false and misleading information to secure a magistrate's 
signature on a search warrant. 
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(3) Affiant asserts without specificity that the name of 
the informant must be kept confidential. His reasons are 
not case specific, but limited to the general and past 
experience of the affiant only. The omission of any case 
specific support for this assertion requires the assertion 
to be stricken and cannot be used to support a finding of 
probable cause. 
(4) Affiant states the premises must be searched for 
packaging material, drug paraphernalia and records of 
distribution. Again, no case specific facts are provided 
to establish the existence of any of these materials. 
These omissions also require the allegations of other drug 
related material being available in the house to be 
stricken as ill-supported in the affidavit. 
(5) A pre-printed page is attached to the affidavit as 
page seven asserting the need for a night time no knock 
search warrant without anything more than a general 
insistence of necessity. No case specific information is 
provided. As with concerns number four and five, material 
omissions here, or unsupported allegations, must be 
stricken from the affidavit and cannot be used to support a 
probable cause finding. Moreover, in State v. Rowe, 806 
P.2d 730 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), the court of appeals 
reversed a conviction where a warrant had been used in such 
an unsupported fashion. 
The State's memorandum in response reiterated that search 
warrants carry a presumption of validity and argued that Defendant 
had not presented any reliable evidence that shows some portion of 
the affidavit is false or missing information. The State also 
charges that defendant's complaints are regarding terminology and 
that defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. (See 
Addendum F for copy of State's memorandum in response.) 
Prior to the next scheduled meeting, the district court 
issued a minute entry decision indicating Defendant's motions were 
denied. A hearing was held were Mr. Wilcox requested that the Court 
7 
prepare findings and conclusions in anticipation of filing an 
appeal. After some time, the court issued a memorandum decision 
asking the state to prepare the documents and an order. The State 
prepared Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Order which 
were subsequently approved as to form, signed and filed. (See 
Addendums G, H and I, respectively, for copies of the court's 
memorandum decision, the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
and the Order.) 
The following findings of fact and conclusions of law were 
filed in this matter: 
Findings of Fact: 
1. That there were no affidavits, nor other sworn or 
reliable statements, nor a satisfactory explanation for the 
absence thereof to support the defendant's allegations that 
the Affidavit supporting the Search Warrant issued in this 
case contained misstatements, misrepresentations or 
ommissions. 
2. That Judge Gowans, as issuing magistrate of the Search 
Warrant, had sufficient, unrebutted information to 
determine that there was probable cause to issue the Search 
Warrant. 
3. That the defendants did not establish that the 
confidential informant was a material witness in that 
he/she was not a witness to the events with which 
defendants are charged. 
4. The defendants did not proffer any evidence that the 
confidential informant did not exist, nor that the 
confidential informant did not give the information to the 
police upon which they relied in their application for a 
search warrant. 
Conclusions of Law: 
1. The Search Warrant is valid being supported by a 
determination of probable cause by the issuing magistrate. 
2. That evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant 
will not be surpressed. 
3. That the confidential informant is not a material 
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witness and not necessary to a fair determination of issues 
nor the defendants7 right to prepare an adequate defense. 
4. That the State will not be ordered to disclose the 
identity of the Confidential Informant. 
The Order in the case succinctly indicates the State's Motion to 
Strike was denied and that the merits were reached on both 
Defendant's Motions with both motions being denied. (See Addendum I 
for a copy of the signed Order in this case.) All other pertinent 
facts are contained within the search warrant and accompanying 
affidavit. See Addendum J for copies of search warrant and 
affidavit. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court's rejection of Mr. Wilcox's two motions 
denies him substantial rights guaranteed by the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 
I, §14, of the Constitution of Utah. Mr. Wilcox insists the Court 
should order the motions to be granted, or at a minimum, order that 
evidentiary hearings are required. 
The United States Supreme Court in Franks v. Delaware, 4 38 
U.S. 154, 156-58 (1978), held that a defendant has the right to have 
an evidentiary hearing where he makes a preliminary showing that a 
false statetment was intentionally included in a search warrant 
affidavit, or was included with a reckless disregard for the truth, 
and such false statement was necessary for a finding of probable 
cause. Notably, in Franks the defendant filed a motion alleging 
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facial inadequacies in the search warrant affidavit not supporting 
the magistrate's finding of probable cause. At the time of the 
hearing on the motion Franks orally amended his challenge to the 
affidavit by supplying the specifics of his claims. The United 
States Supreme Court permitted this method as adequate to identify 
the specific concerns. Id. at 157-58. 
In two Utah cases subsequent to Franks, our Utah Supreme 
Court adopted, then extended, the Franks position. In State v. 
Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985), citing Franks, the Court stated 
that "false statements in a probable cause affidavit made knowingly, 
intentionally, or recklessly, can invalidate a warrant issued in 
reliance thereon {citation omitted}." In State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 
188 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court of Utah again followed Franks but 
extended that analysis to include material omissions as well as 
material misrepresentations. The Court noted: 
A law enforcement officer must be aware not only of the 
need for accuracy in the information provided to a 
magistrate in support of an application for a search 
warrant, but also of the absolute truthfulness of any 
statements made under oath. 
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191. 
In the case before the Court in this petition the affiant 
presented to the magistrate a claim of probable cause that distorted 
the truth. The affiant, inter alia, claimed that several 
"controlled" buys had occurred between a confidential informant 
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through the use of an unwitting individual. This statement is 
false, and materially false when realized that there was no 
legitimate control over the confidential informant because after 
being searched by the affiant he was joined by another individual in 
each purported buy who was not controlled, i.e., was not himself 
subject to search either before or after the alleged drug purchase. 
In Franks the United States Supreme Court stated: 
The pre-search proceeding will frequently be marked by 
haste, because of the understandable desire to act before 
the evidence disappears; this urgency will not always 
permit the magistrate to make an extended independent 
examination of the affiant or other witnessess. 
[A]llowing an evidentiary hearing, after a suitable 
preliminary proffer of material falsity, would not diminish 
the importance and solemnity of the warrant issuing 
process. It is the ex parte nature of the initial hearing 
rather than the magistrate's capacity, that is the reason 
for the review. 
Franks, 438 U.S. at 169-70. Particularly because the pre-search 
proceeding is conducted ex parte and marked by haste, the nature of 
the affiant's material falsehood or misstatement that the buys in 
this case were controlled is critical to the finding of probable 
cause. A reviewing magistrate when reading the phrase "controlled 
buy" repeated over and over again in the probable cause affidavit is 
apt to be mislead and not realize that the true facts identified in 
the statement do not actually equate to buys which are, in fact, 
fully controlled. On these facts, absence of controlled buys 
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results in absence of probable cause. 
Similarly, the other four identified misstatements, 
misrepresentations and omissions likewise indicate that a magistrate 
conducting the review of the affidavit, in haste and in ex parte 
fashion, would easily be mislead into a determination of probable 
cause by the terms and claims identified by the affiant but 
unsupported in actuality. Repeatedly referring to an informant as 
reliable, despite the fact that nothing is supporting the claim, may 
well influence a magistrate toward a finding of probable cause 
otherwise not supported by any case specific information. 
The affiant's claims that the informant's name need be kept 
confidential for fear of reprisal; that packaging material, drug 
paraphenalia and drug distribution records will be present; and that 
a night time no knock warrant is required clearly suggests that Mr. 
Wilcox is a dangerous individual demanding immediate attention and 
justifying the issuance of a search warrant. Factually, however, 
this message of dangerousness is inappropriate on these facts 
because these claims in the affidavit are supported only by the 
officer's experience and belief that such is the case, and no case 
specific facts exist in the affidavit which allow this message to 
legitimately reach the magistrate to influence a decision to issue 
the warrant. State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), 
affirms the concept that the affidavit must contain facts from which 
a magistrate could infer the claims of the affiant. The facts in 
this case, at a minimum on the issuance of a night time search 
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warrant, are indistinguishable from Rowe and require that the lower 
court's decision in this case be reversed. 
REASONS JUSTIFYING ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT 
The issues presented before the Court in this petition are 
meritorious. Moreover, the issues presented herein substantially 
resolve the litigation of this case. Because the issues involve 
pre-trial suppression of evidence, an appellate opinion correcting 
the erroneous position of the court below at this juncture prior to 
trial is in the interest of judicial economy. 
Additionally, state constitutional claims have been 
addressed and this petition provides the vehicle for this Court to 
review the issues and establish guidelines on the state 
constitutional questions. Little would be gained by requiring this 
case to go to trial only then, assuming a conviction occurs, to 
appeal these very issues. The Court of Appeals should have granted 
the interlocutory request. Also, one judge of the three-member 
panel of the Court of Appeals did indicate his dissent from the 
denial, arguably indicating the issues have some merit and should be 
examined by this Court in its supervisory capacity. This Court 
should correct that decision made below and hear these questions to 
streamline the potentially redundant procedural avenue otherwise 
ahead for Mr. Wilcox. 
This Court should address the state constitutional issue 
itself, because of the significance of the questions presented, or 
alternatively require that evidentiary hearings be held on the 
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motions in the trial court so that a more complete record exists 
from which to examine state requirements for the review of warrant 
issues. 
Notably, Mr. Wilcox is not in custody and his interests are 
not harmed but rather are benefitted by an interlocutory decision 
from this Court. Likewise, the State's case consists of police 
officer witnesses who will still be available if this Court accepts 
this petition then affirms the decisions below and the case proceeds 
to trial. The State's position is not harmed by this appeal. 
An appellate decision on these facts will likely resolve 
the case as the admissibility of the evidence available to the state 
will be determined by this Court. Additionally, substantial 
guidance from this Court would be beneficial to the courts below in 
detailing the appropriate course(s) of action. 
CONCLUSION 
This Petition presents serious issues of constitutional 
magnitude which were not adequately or correctly addressed below. 
The resolution of these issues by appeal at this juncture will save 
time and resources of all involved, including the judiciary. 
Moreover, a decision on these issues will substantially resolve the 
dispute, if not in its entirety. Also, important state 
constitutional issues which should be addressed by this Court are 
raised and a decision on these facts will greatly assist the lower 
courts. 
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For all or any of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Wilcox 
respectfully requests this Court to grant his Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
Respectfully submitted this 
^ 
day_x>f March, 1992. 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/PETITIONER 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foreoging to the Office of 
the Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
and Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 this tf3[ day of March, 19< 
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ADDENDUM A 
1 Ll 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
James Frank Wilcox, 
Defendant and 'Respondent*. 
ORDER 
Case No. 920013-CA 
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Orme (Law & Motion) 
This matter is betore the court on a petition for 
permission to appeal from an interlocutory order. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is denied. 
Dated thi s ^ - c day of February 1992, 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
< - * < - ^ 
I dissent. 
Gregor^R. Orme, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of February, 1992, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand-delivered to a 
personal representative of the Attorney General's Office and 
Legal Defender's Office to be delivered to the parties listed 
below: 
Richard G. Uday 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
Attorneys at Law 
424 East Fifth South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
R. Paul Van Dam 
State Attorney General 
Governmental Affairs 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 34114 
Dated this 6th day of February, 1992. 
By :
 : _ 1 
Deputy Clerk 
ADDENDUM B 
RICHARD G. UDAY, #S3S5 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
4 2 4 E a s t 500 S o u t h , S u i t e 300 
S a l t LaJce C i t y , U t a h 84111 
T e l e p h o n e : 5 3 2 - 5 4 4 4 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATS OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE UNLAWFULLY SEIZED 
P l a i n t i f f , : 
v s . : 
JAMES WILCOX, : Case No. 911900621FS 
JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH 
D e f e n d a n t . : 
The d e f e n d a n t , JAMES WILCOX, by and t h r o u g h h i s c o u n s e l o f 
r e c o r d , RICHARD G. UDAY, h e r e b y moves t h i s c o u r t f o r an o r d e r 
s u p p r e s s i n g a i l t h e e v i d e n c e s e i z e d p u r u s a n t t o t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t 
s e r v e d i n t h i s c a s e . 
A l l e v i d e n c e t a k e n from 1605 Sou th R i c h a r d s S t r e e t , S a l t 
L a k e C i t y , U t a h , was s e i z e d p u r s u a n t t o a s e a r c h w a r r a n t i s s u e d 
w i t h o u t p r o b a b l e c a u s e i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e F o u r t h and F o u r t e e n t h 
A m e n d m e n t s t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and i n v i o l a t i o n o f 
A r t i c l e I , S e c t i o n 14 of t h e Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n . S p e c i f i c a l l y , 
m i s s t a t e m e n t s and f a l s e and m i s r e p r e s e n t e d i n f o r m a t i o n e x i s t w i t h i n 
t h e s u p p o r t i n g a f f i d a v i t which r e n d e r i t i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t a 
f i n d i n g o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e above c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
p r o t e c t i o n s . F r a n k s v . D e l a w a r e , 433 U . S . 154 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ; S t a t e v . 
N i e l s e n , .727 P. 2d 133 (Utah 1986). Addi t ional ly , the supporting 
a f f i d a v i t laclced s u f f i c i e n t factual inforaat ion t o support the 
i s s u a n c e o f a n igh t - t ime "no-knock" search warrant. State v . Rove. 
154 Utah. Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah App. February 8, 1991)^ 
DATED t h i s / day of Ju ly , 1991. 
"RICHARD G. -HJDAy L 
Attorney for Defendant 
fJh^ 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of 
t h e County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, S a l t Lake City, Utah 
8 4 1 1 1 , t h i s _ / _ d a y of July, 1991. 
fl 
(USS tfiWutV) 
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ADDENDUM C 
RICHARD G. UDAY, #5355 
A t t o r n e y f o r Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC 
424 E a s t 500 S o u t h , S u i t e 300 
S a l t LaJce C i t y , Utah 84111 
T e l e p h o n e : 5 3 2 - 5 4 4 4 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, MOTION TO DISCOVER IDENTITY 
OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
JAKES WILCOX, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
Case No- 911900621FS 
JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH 
The d e f e n d a n t , JAMES WILCOX, by and through h i s c o u n s e l o f 
r e c o r d , RICHARD G- UDAY, hereby moves t h i s Court for an order 
r e q u i r i n g t h e S t a t e to r evea l to the defense t h e name of the 
c o n f i d e n t i a l in formants in t h i s c a s e . 
The name of the c o n f i d e n t i a l informants u t i l i z e d in t h i s 
c a s e must be d i s c l o s e d to the defense to assure a fa i r determination 
o f t h e i s s u e s , inc luding the Motion to Suppress Evidence Unlawfully 
S e i z e d f i l e d with the Court* Fourth, Fif th and Fourteenth 
Amendments t o the United States Const i tut ion; A r t i c l e I , 
§ §_7, 12 and 14 of the Const i tut ion of Utah; Roviaro v. United 
States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) ; and State v. Forshee, 611 P. 2d 1222 
(Utah 1980). 
DATED this I day of July, 
{for* 
"RICHAgD tt. UDAi J 
Attorney for /Defendant 
MAILZD/DELTVE3RED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of 
the County Attorney, 231 East 400 south, Salt Lake city,. Utah 
84111, this r^x day of July, 1991. 
77 / / /' 
ADDENDUM D 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
RUTH J. MCCLOSKZY, Bar No. 2153 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff, ) MOTION TO STRIKE 
V. ) Case No. 911900621FS 
JAMES WILCOX, ) Honorable John A- Rokich 
Defendant. ) 
The State of Utah, by and through Ruth J. McCloskey, 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, hereby moves this Court for an 
Order striking that iscrion concerning the Suppression of Evidence 
due to the alleged insufficiency of information to support a 
finding of probable cause to support the search warrant in this 
case. The motion is set to be heard at 3:00 p.m. on Monday, the 
8th day of July, 1991, before the Honorable John A. Rokich. 
The Motion to Strike is based on the case of Franks v. 
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 88 S.Ct 2674 (1978), in which the Supreme 
Court stated, "There is, of course, a presumption of validity with 
respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant," at 2684. 
The Court stated further at 2676, 
(a) To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the 
challenger's attack must be more than conclusory 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
Case No-* 911900621FS 
Page two 
and must be supported by more than a mere desire 
to cross-examine. The allegation of deliberate 
falsehood or of reckless disregard must point out 
specificallv with supporting reasons the portion 
of the warrant affidavit that is claimed to be 
false. It also must be accompanied Jy/ an affsr / 
Proof, including affidavits or or otherwise 
i±-< p^ Y 1 1 " 1 0 < ; J & ^ o r a 
explanation of their absence. (emphasis added.) 
The Court summarized, at 2684, 
Nor, if a sensible threshold showing is 
required and sensible substantive requirements for 
suppression are maintained, need there be any new 
large-scale commitment of judicial resources; many 
claims will wash out at an early stage, and the 
more substantial ones in any event would require 
judicial resources for vindication if the 
suggested alternative sanctions were truly to be 
effective. The requirement of a substantial 
preliminary showing would suffice to prevent the 
misuse of a veracity hearing for purposes of 
discovery or obstruction. 
Defendant: has not met the burden and is not entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this day of July, 1991. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
^/Mrffr/< <UJ-
RUTJf J. / MCCLOSKZY 
Deputy County Attorney 
RJM/sc/0399 
ADDENDUM E 
RICHARD G. UDAY, (#5355) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE .LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
Plaintiff STATE'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
V. : SUPPRESS 
JAMES FRANK WILCOX, : Case No. 911900621FS 
: JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH 
Defendant 
FACTS 
On February 21, 1991, a night time no-knock search warrant 
was obtained from Third Circuit Judge Floyd H. Gowans by Detective 
B.H. Jensen of the Metropolitan Narcotics Strike Force, the affiant 
in the affidavit filed in support of the search warrant. At night 
on the 22nd of February, officers of the Metropolitan Narcotics 
Strike Force served the warrant at 1605 South Richards Street in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, obtaining evidence of illicit drugs. 
Responding to the charges filed against him, Mr. Wilcox 
filed two motions regarding this case. Mr. Wilcox filed a Motion to 
Suppress Evidence unlawfully seized by the police officers in 
violation of state and federal constitutional provisions. See 
Addendum A. Mr. Wilcox asserted the affidavit contained 
misstatements and false and misrepresented information rendering it 
insufficient to support a finding of probable cause as required by 
both state and federal strictures. 
In the same motion Mr. Wilcox insisted that the issuance of 
the night-time no-knock search warrant violated state and federal 
constitutional provisions because the affidavit filed in support of 
the warrant lacked sufficient factual information to support the 
issuance of the search warrant. Id. 
Mr. Wilcox's second motion filed with the Court requested 
an Order requiring the state to reveal to the defense the name of 
the confidential informants in this case, again asserting state and 
federal constitutional provisions requiring the discovery. See 
Addendum B. 
At the appointed time scheduled to argue the above motions 
the state filed a Motion to Strike Mr. Wilcox's Morion to Suppress 
Evidence due to the alleged insufficiency of information to support 
a finding of probable cause to support the search warrant. See 
Addendum C. The state argued that Mr. Wilcox failed to meet his 
burden of specifying the portions of the affidavit in support of the 
warrant claimed to be false, retailed in an offer of proof, 
affidavit, sworn or otherwise reliable statement of witnesses, or 
satisfactory explanation of their absence. See State's Motion to 
Strike at page 2. (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)}. 
This Court heard argument on the State's Motion to Strike, 
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indicating an initial inclination to grant that motion, but 
permitted briefing on the issue raised by the state • 
POINT 
MR. WILCOX HAS MET HIS BURDEN TO CONTINUE WITH AN 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE QUESTION OF 
MISSTATEMENTS, OMISSIONS, AND FALSE AND 
MISREPRESENTED INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE 
SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT. 
A. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the United 
States Supreme Court affirmatively addressed the issue now presented 
to this Court. The facts and holding of Franks are particularly 
instructive to this Court. In Franks, the Defendant filed a motion 
alleging facial inadequacies not supporting a finding of probable 
cause by the magistrate; the Defendant orally amended his challenge 
to the affidavit supplying the specifics of his claims at the motion 
hearing specifically requesting the right to civil witnesses. 
Franks, 438 U.S. at 157-158. 
The prosecution (and lower courts) in Franks believed that 
attacks on the warrant affidavit were limited to facial attacks and 
decided that the defense could not go behind the four corners of the 
affidavit and warrant. The United States Supreme Court reversed 
that ruling and held that a defendant has the right to an evidentiary 
hearing where he or she makes a preliminary showing that a false 
statement was intentionally included in a search warrant affidavit, 
or was included with a reckless disregard for the truth, and such 
false statement was necessary to a finding of prohable cause. 438 
U.S. at 156. At such hearing, if the defendant establishes by 
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a preponderance of the evidence that the false statement was 
intentionally included, or included with a reckless disregard for 
the truth, the false material must be excised from the affidavit and 
the remaining information contained in the affidavit must be 
reviewed for a determination as to whether it supports a finding of 
probable cause. If probable cause does not exist without the 
excised material, the search must be voided and the items seized 
under the warrant excluded "to the same extent as if probable cause 
was lacking on the face of the affidavit-n Id. 
In State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985), reh'cr denied 
(1986) , the Utah Supreme Court, citing Franks v. Delaware, 
acknowledged that "[f]alse statements in a probable cause affidavit 
made knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly, can invalidate a 
warrant issued in reliance thereon. [citation omitted]." In State 
v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), cert, denied, 107 S. Ct. 1565, 
decided shortly after Slowe, the Supreme Court followed tne fourth 
amendment in Franks v. Delaware but extended that analysis to 
include material omissions as well as material misrepresentations. 
The Supreme Court noted: 
A law enforcement officer must be aware not only 
of the need for accuracy in the information 
provided to a magistrate in support of an 
application for a search warrant, but also of the 
absolute truthfulness of any statements made 
under oath. 
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191. 
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Federal constitutional provisions naturally require, 
therefore, that this Court review the findings of the magistrate 
below particularly examining the identified portions of the 
affidavit proffered as establishing the preliminary showing of 
intentional false statements, misstatements, omissions, or 
statements included by the affiant but made with reckless disregard 
for the truth- Franks, 438 U.S. at 156; Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 190-91 
(courts must be particularly vigilant in assessing claim that police 
officer has misrepresented information in the affidavit). 
The United States Supreme Court explained: 
[A] flat ban on impeachment of veracity could 
denude the probable cause requirement of all real 
meaning. The requirement that a warrant not 
issue "but upon probable cause, supported by oath 
or affirmation," would be reduced to a nullity if 
a police officer was able to use deliberately 
falsified allegations to demonstrate probable 
cause, and, having misled the magistrate, then 
was aisle to remain confident that the ploy was 
worthwhile. 
Franks, 438 U.S. ar 163. The Court went on to explain that 
precisely because the pre-search proceeding (obtains the search 
warrant) is necessarily ex parte, and less vigorous than an 
adversarial proceeding, that the decision below is reviewable by 
this Court. Id. at 169. 
The Court stated: 
The pre-search proceeding will frequently be 
marked by haste, because of the understandable 
desire to act before the evidence disappears; 
this urgency will not always permit the 
magistrate to make an extended independent 
examination of the affiant or other witnesses. 
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[a]llowing an evidentiary hearing, after a 
suitable preliminary proffer of material falsity, 
would not diminish the importance and solemnity 
of the warrant issuing process. It is the ex 
parte nature of the initial hearing rather than 
the magistrate's capacity, that is the reason for 
the review• A magistrate's determination is 
presently subject to review before trial as to 
sufficiency without any interference with the 
dignity of the magistrate's function. 
Id. at 169-70 (emphasis in original) . 
Mr. Wilcox reiterates the following misstatements, 
misrepresentations and omissions for the preliminary showing 
required to hold a hearing on the sufficiency of the warrant absent 
the excised statements. (Warrant and affidavit attached at Addendum 
D.) 
1. Affiant Jensen swears that he has made controlled 
purchases of cocaine from a "Sue" and "John" at the named residence 
through a "CRI" from "unwitting individuals (1 and 2)" on several 
occasions- Affidavit, page 3. Jensen specifies three "controlled" 
purchases made within eight weeks, two weeks and seventy-two hours, 
respectively. In each instance, however, Jensen misstates the 
controlled nature of the buys thereby misleading the magistrate to 
the quality of the evidence in support of probable cause. 
In each incident, Jensen describes controls on the 
confidential informant, such as pre and post buy searches of the 
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informant and his vehicle, yet no control is ever in place on a 
third party, designated unwilling individual number 1 and 2, who 
meets with the confidential informant. The informant never has 
contact with the residence of 1605 South Richards Street. 
On the first buy, nothing in the affidavit establishes that 
the unwitting individual was seen entering or exiting 1605 South 
Richards Street. Rather, Jensen merely concludes the informant told 
him that "the deal was done near the named premises because 
unwilling individual number 1 ["UI #1] had to obtain the cocaine 
from the named premises" prior to the delivery to the informant. 
On the second buy, again no control of UI #2's purchase is 
given nor any surveillance or connection to the purchase. 
Nonetheless, Jensen misrepresents this purchase as "controlled" 
because he again searched informant before and after the purchase; 
he never searches UI #1 nor #2 to ascertain the existence of cocaine 
prior to the buy or money following the buy. Notably, UI =1 is 
surveiled as present "at the scene" when UI if2 enters. (Conclusions 
trying probable cause to search the property rather than UI "1 
unvailing.) While "controlled" and "monitored" are items describing 
these exchanges, no definitions of the terms are provided beyond 
those involving the informant. No true "controls" exist. 
The third alleged controlled purchase is equally fraught 
with misstatement and misrepresentation. While the forms 
"monitored" and/or "controlled" are used on less than five times in 
this buy, again no information is provided that established any pre 
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or post-buy control over anyone other than the informant • Moreover, 
the affidavit does not confirm consistent surveillance over UI Jl or 
#2 throughout their involvements as to other possible purchase 
points or prior possessions of their own. 
These misstatements and misrepresentations regarding the 
control buys in this affidavit, under the law outlined above, are 
material falsehoods which must be stricken from the affidavit and it 
examined on its own* As the Court explained in Franks, during the 
urgencies of the ex parte warrant acquisition proceeding such 
misstatements and misrepresentations likely influenced the decision 
below which must be reviewed by this Court in the pre-trial hearing 
session. 
2. In similar fashion to point 1 above, Jensen imbues the 
confidential informant in this case with the title of "confidential 
reliable informant." The term "reliable," however, is ill-supported 
by any information within the affidavit. Jensen dees indicate that 
the informant made statements against his interest, but does not 
provide any detail about these statements, nor any other information 
to support his conclusion that the informant is reliable. Notably, 
no other information is supplied regarding other previous purchases 
or ongoing investigations indicating successfulness of those 
projects. These omissions are material falsehoods under Nielsen and 
must be omitted and probable cause redetermined. The label of 
"reliable" likewise may have impacted on the original finding of 
probable cause thereby justifying review by this Court absent that 
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language. See also, State v. Rove, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah App. 
February 8, 1991) (no information provided to permit magistrate to 
find need for nigh-time warrant, other than affiant's Accord, 
assertions and conclusions, render it invalid). State v. 
Stephenson, 387 So.2d 1111 (Ca. 1980) (mere assertion informant has 
participated in controlled buys leading to arrests says nothing at 
all about informant's credibility) ; Barber v. State, 406 A. 2d 668 
(Hd. App. 1979) (previous buy unrelated to present search warrant 
does not prove veracity of informant). 
3. Affiant Jensen asserts without specificity that the 
informant's name can not be revealed. No specific reason, other 
than general and past experience rationale, is provided. As in 
Rowe, the failure to provide case specific information is a fatal 
omission in the affidavit. As noted above in points 1 and 2, the 
identification of the informant in this case is essential to a fair 
determination of the issues to explore the omissions left out of 
affidavit which impact on credibility and reliability issues in the 
affidavit- See Defendant's motion in Addendum B. 
4. In pages four and five of the affidavit, Jensen states 
the premises must be searched for packaging material, drug 
paraphernalia and records of distribution. His sworn statement, 
however, provides no case specific facts, other than his own 
personal experience, to establish the present of any of these 
materials. These omissions and misrepresentations render the 
affidavit fatal as in Rowe. 
5. Finally, the preprinted page seven of the affidavit 
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asserting the need for a night-time no knock warrant is, as in Rove, 
without support and without anything more that general 
misrepresentation without basis in fact* The warrant was signed a 
day prior to service and illustrates the erroneous nature of the 
claims provided within this section of the affidavit. This issue 
alone requires a striking of the warrant and suppression of the 
evidence* Howe, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16-17. 
This proffer of proof meets the requirements articulated in 
Franks and Nielsen under the federal constitution and, at a minimum, 
requires this Court to hold the evidentiary hearing requested by the 
Mr. Wilcox. 
B. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Utah is free to interpret Article I, Section 14 of its 
state constitution differently from the fourth amendment to the 
United States Constitution. See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 
465-6 (Utah 1990); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1933); State 
v. Earl, 716 P.2d 303 (Utah 1986); State v, Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 
1247 n.5 (Utah 1933); State v. Kvah, 711 P.2d 264, 271-72 (Utah 
1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that federal law 
under the fourth amendment has become "a labyrinth of rules built 
upon a series of contradictory and confusing rationalizations and 
distinctions,,f Hygh, 711 P.2d at 271-72, and that in certain 
contexts, a distinct analysis under Article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution may be preferable to a fourth amendment analysis. 
Id. 
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In Larocco, 794 P.2d at 465, the Supreme Court relied on 
Article I, section 14 in deciding that "an officer's opening a car 
door to examine a VIN on a door jamb" constituted an unreasonable 
search under the State Constitution. This Court recognized that 
federal fourth amendment law, especially in the context of 
automobile searches, "has been a source of much confusion among 
judges, lawyers and police. Id. at 466. Although the Court 
indicated that if it were deciding the false under federal law, it 
"would hold that a search was conducted within the meaning of the 
fourth amendment," it nevertheless reached its decision under the 
State Constitution. The Court stated: 
The time has come for this court, in applying an 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement 
of arricle I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, 
to try to simplify, if possible the search and 
seizure rules so that they can be more easily 
followed by the police and courts and, at the 
sane time, provide the public with consistent and 
predictable projection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. 
Case law from Utah and other jurisdictions supports a 
distinct analysis under Article I, section 14 where an officer 
includes falsehoods in an affidavit. 
In State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), the Court 
concluded that the falsehood contained in the affidavit was not 
material and upheld the search warrant under the Franks fourth 
amendment analysis. The Court pointed out, however, that the 
decision was not dispositive of how the issue might be resolved 
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under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The Court 
acknowledged that "the federal law it has developed since Franks v. 
Delaware is not entirely adequate" and that w[t]here is no stronger 
argument for developing adequate remedies for violation of the state 
and federal constitutional prohibitions on unreasonable searches and 
seizures than the example of a police officer deliberately lying 
under oath in order to obtain a search warrant," Li. at 192-3 • 
Hence, an analysis tinder the Utah Constitution distance from that in 
Franks v. Delaware is appropriate where misrepresentations are 
included in an affidavit in support of a search warrant or omitted 
therefrom. Under the Utah Constitution intentional 
misrepresentations should invalidate the warrant regardless of 
whether probable cause exists after the offensive portions are 
excised, and where an officer negligently includes falsehoods, the 
falsehoods should be excised and the remainder of the affidavit 
assessed for a determination as to whether probable cause exists. 
See Moreau v. State, 588 P.2d 275 (Alaska 1973); State v. Malkin, 
722 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1936); State v. Caldwell, 334 So.2d 431 (La. 
1980); Peoole v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1978). 
The Alaska Supreme Court has deviated from the decision in 
Franks in interpreting its constitutional prescription against 
unreasonable search and seizure. See Moreau v. State, 588 P.2d 275 
(Alaska 1978); State v. Malkin, 722 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1986). In 
State v. Malkin, the Court noted: 
If, in fact, the police officer affiant 
intentionally made the misstatements then 
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the search warrant should be invalidated whether 
.or not probable cause would remain from the 
affidavit after the misstatements were excised. 
A deliberate attempt to mislead a judicial 
officer in a sworn affidavit deserves the most 
severe deterrent sanction that the exclusionary 
rule can provide. Further, the fact that the 
officer has lied puts the credibility of the 
officer and of the entire affidavit into doubt• 
Id. at 946 n.6 (Citations omitted)* 
The Louisiana Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion 
that a warrant cannot nsurvive the intentional deception of a 
magistrate by an affiant11 in State v. Caldwell, 384 So.2d 431 (La. 
1980). 
In Peoole v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1978), the California 
Supreme Court also determined that where deliberate falsehoods are 
contained in an affidavit, the entire affidavit and search warrant 
must be quashed. The Court noted: 
Contrary to the case of negligent mistakes, 
excision of deliberate falsehoods in an affidavit 
does not leave the remaining allegations 
unaffected and hence presumptively true. The 
fact that the misstatements are intentional 
injects a new element into the analysis, to wit, 
the doctrine that a witness knowingly false in 
one part of his testimony is to be distrusted in 
the whole. 
Id. at 140. The Court summed up that "although the court can excise 
the intentionally false allegations it cannot presume the remainder 
to be true. Lacking a reliable factual basis in the affidavit, the 
court has no alternative under settled constitutional principles but 
to quash the warrant and exclude the product of search. [Citations 
omitted.]" Id. at 141. 
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The Court pointed out that elimination of intentional 
falsehoods is not enough since officers would have "everything to 
gain and nothing to lose in strengthening an otherwise marginal 
affidavit by letting their intense dedication to duty blur the 
distinction between fact and fantasy. [Citations omitted.]11 Id. 
The reasoning of the Alaska, Louisiana and California 
courts, when read together with Nielsen, among others, should be 
adopted when analyzing Article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Where an officer intentionally includes false 
information in an affidavit or includes such information with a 
reckless disregard for its truth, the entire affidavit should be 
invalidated. The fact that a significant misrepresentation was 
included in an affidavit, despite the officer's awareness of the 
necessity for accuracy, State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191, raises a 
question as to the reliability and veracity of the information 
contained in the rest of the affidavit. Furthermore, officers who 
intentionally or recklessly include falsehoods in an affidavit 
should realize that negative repercussions will result from the use 
of such misrepresentations. 
This Court should follow the lead of other state courts and 
interpret Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution to require 
that where an officer affiant intentionally or recklessly includes 
material misstatements in and omits material information from an 
affidavit, the entire affidavit must.be invalidated. In addition, 
this Court should interpret the State Constitution to require the 
excision of misstatements which are negligently included in an 
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a f f i d a v i t , pursuant to e i ther approach, the search warrant was 
i n v a l i d under the Utah Constitution and evidence seized pursuant to 
the i n v a l i d warrant should be suppressed. 
Respectful ly submitted th i s^ /c? jiay tfjutf, 1991. 
Attorney for Defen 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's 
Of f i ce , 231 E- Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, th i s 
day of July , 1991. 
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ADDENDUM F 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake 'County Attorney 
RUTH J. MCCLOSKEY, Bar No. 2153 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, DT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
Plaintiff, ) DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM 
v. ) Case No. 911900621FS 
JAMES FRANK WILCOX, ) 
Honorable John Rokich 
Defendant. ) 
Facts 
The State accepts the defendant's statement of the facts 
as s e t out in h i s memorandum. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THE STATE'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE-THE DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
Under Franks v. Delaware. 438 U.S. 154, 88 S.Ct. 2674 
(1978) , an Affidavit supporting a search warrant carries a 
presumption of validity and in order to obtain an evidentiary 
hearing to challenge that Affidavit, the defendant must at least 
offer some reliable evidence that shows that some portion of the 
Affidavit is false or there is some missing information. 
STATEffS RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM 
Case No. 911900621FS 
Page two 
Defendant has not offered any information that is not 
contained in the body of the Affidavit but merely argues with the 
affiant's terminology. Defendant does not add information that was 
not available to Judge Gowans at the time that Judge Gowans 
determined that there was sufficient probable cause to issue the 
search warrant. 
Therefore, defendant has not met his preliminary 
obligation which if met would warrant an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue of probable cause for the warrant. 
DATED this f? day of July, 1991. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
RUTH'J / MCCLOSKEY ^/ 
Deputy County Attorney4^ 
RMc/sc/0407 
S t a t e v . Wilcox 
Case No. 911900621FS 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t on t h i s [t/^'dav of J u l y , 1991 , I 
m a i l e d a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of the foregoing Response t o 
D e f e n d a n t ' s Memorandum t o RICHARD G. UDAY, Attorney f o r Defendant, 
a t t h e a d d r e s s s t a t e d below. 
V . S36r*tary 
k4 
RICHARD G. UDAY, ESQ. 
Attorney for the Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
sc/0407 
ADDENDUM G 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 0 3 1991 
- SALTL 
* - r ^ A dd 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES WILCOX, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 911900621 
The Motion of the defendant to suppress evidence to 
discover identity of confidential informant, and plaintiff's 
Motion to Strike were heard on July 12, 1991. The Court heard 
the oral arguments of counsel, read the Memoranda submitted, 
and ruled from the bench on the defendant's Morion to identify 
the confidential informant and on plaintiff's Motion to 
Strike. The Court denied the defendant's Motion to name the 
confidential informant for the reasons set forth in plaintiff's 
Memorandum. The Court denied plaintiff's Motion to Strike 
because the Court was of the opinion that the defendant should 
have the opportunity to be heard on the issue of suppression of 
evidence. 
The Court granted plaintiff and defendant the opportunity 
to submit Memoranda on the issue of suppression of evidence. 
STATE V. WILCOX PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Court read the Memoranda submitted and entered its oral 
ruling denying defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
The Court concluded from reading the defendant's Memoranda 
that their allegations that the Affidavit of Detective B.H. 
Jensen in support of the search warrant contained 
misstatements, misrepresentations and omissions were not 
supported by affidavits, or sworn or any reliable statements of 
witnesses or satisfactory explanation of their absence; 
therefore, the motion to suppress should be denied. 
The Court further concluded that Judge Gowans had 
sufficient information unrebutted by defendant to determine 
that there was probable cause to issue the search warrant. 
The Court refers the parties to plaintiff's Memoranda for 
additional reasons for the denial of defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. 
Plaintiff shall prepare the necessary findings, conclusions 
and order in accordance with this Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this ^ day of October, 1991. 
A( 
\JOHN A. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
STATE V. WILCOX PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, 
this 3 day of October, 1991: 
Ruth J. McCloskey 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Richard G. Uday 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111 
ADDENDUM H 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
RUTH J. MCCLOSKEY, Bar .No. 2153 
Deputy County "Attorney 
231 East 400 South,"TSuite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 By 
FILED IN CLSHJCS OFFICE 
Sal! l2'.:s Countv llrah 
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} XVCM. 
Clerk 3rd Oist Court 
Qeputy Clark 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
JAMES WILCOX & SUZANNE WILCOX, 
Defendant• 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 911900621FS 
Honorable John A. Rokich 
On J u l y 12 , 1991, the Court heard ora l arguments on 
D e f e n d a n t ' s Motion t o Suppress Evidence and Defendant's Motion t o 
D i s c o v e r t h e i d e n t i t y of a c o n f i d e n t i a l informant, as wel l as on 
t h e S t a t e ' s Motion t o S t r i k e Defendant's Motion t o Suppress. After 
r e a d i n g memoranda submitted by both p a r t i e s , the Court makes the 
f o l l o w i n g F ind ings o f Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1« That t h e r e were no a f f i d a v i t s , nor o ther sworn or 
r e l i a b l e s t a t e m e n t s , nor a s a t i s f a c t o r y exp lanat ion for the absence 
t h e r e o f t o support t h e defendant 's a l l e g a t i o n s ' t h a t t h e A f f i d a v i t 
s u p p o r t i n g t h e Search Warrant i s sued ~±n~ t h i s case contained 
m i s s t a t e m e n t s , m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s or o m i s s i o n s . 
2. That Judge Gowans, as i s s u i n g magi s tra te of the 
Search Warrant, had s u f f i c i e n t , unrebutted information t o determine 
FINDINGS OF,FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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that there was probable cause to issue the Search Warrant* 
3* That the defendants did not establish that the 
confidential informant was a material witness in that he/she was 
not a witness to the events with which defendants are charged. 
4. The defendants did not proffer any evidence that 
the confidential informant did not exist, nor that the confidential 
informant did not give the information to the police upon which 
they relied in their application for ^ search warrant. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Search Warrant is valid being supported by a 
determination of probable cause by th^ issuing magistrate. 
2. That evidence obtained pursuant to the Search 
Warrant will not be suppressed. 
3. That the confidential informant is not a material 
witness and not necessary to a fair determination of issues nor the 
defendants' right to prepare an adequate defense. 
4. That the State will not be ordered to disclose the 
identity of the Confidential Informant. 
DATED this day of December, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
JJU A C?JLl 
VHQBfoRABLE JOHN A. ROklCH 
^I&RD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
R M c / s c / 0 4 7 0 
State v. James Wilcox 
and Suzanne Wilcox 
Case No. 911900621FS 
CERTIFICATE OF -MAILING (T—' 
I hereby certify that on this /0 day of December, 
1991, I jaailod a true and- correct copy of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law to MICHAEL JONES and RICHARD UDAY, 
Attorneys for Defendants, 3rtr-thQ addroGncjs aLaUuI Leliw. 
l*JM<P£*J:., 
RICHARD UDAY, ESQ. 
Attorney for the Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake city, Utah 84111 
MICHAEL JONES, ESQ. 
Attorney for the Defendant 
Brickyard Towers 
1245 East Brickyard Road, Suite 530 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
SC/0470 
ADDENDUM I 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt LaJce County Attorney 
ROTH J. MCCLOSKEY, Bar No. 2153 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt LaJce City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
P'-CD IN CLEHICS OFFICE 
Szi: l2,-.3 County Utah 
DEC I t 1991 
*r*1< 3rd Oist Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JAMES WILCOX & SUZANNE WILCOX, 
Defendant. 
O R D E R 
Case No. 911900621FS 
Honorable John A. Rokich 
Pursuant to memoranda and arguments of counsel, the Court 
for good cause shown, does hereby ORDER THAT; 
1. State's Motion to Strike is denied and a decision 
is made on the merits of Defendant's Motion to Suppress the 
Evidence. 
2. Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied and no 
evidence in this matter will be suppressed based on the search 
warrant. 
3. Defendant's Motion seeking the identity of the 
ORDER 
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c o n f i d e n t i a l informant i s denied. 
DATED t h i s day of December, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
Attorney for 
sc/0470 
r,U . A. Ql± 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
S t a t e v . James Wilcox 
and Suzanne Wilcox 
Case No. 911900621FS 
CERTIFICATE OF -MAILING 
I hereby c e r t i f y tha t on t h i s K/9 day of December, 
* -j * i 
1 9 9 1 , I a a i l o d a t r u e and correc t copy of t h e foregoing Order t o 
MICHAEL JONES and RICHARD UDAY, Attorneys f o r Defendants, a t the 
a d d r e s s e s s t a t e d be low. 
6/ dUf-'tiA 
Secre tary 
RICHARD UDAY, ESQ. 
Attorney for the Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt LaJce City, Utah 84111 
MICHAEL JONES, ESQ. 
Attorney for the Defendant 
Brickyard Towers 
1245 East Brickyard Road, Suite 530 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
SC/0470 
ADDENDUM J 
IN TEE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SAL? LAKE OSPARTUSNT 
IN AND TOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LASS, STATS 0? UTAH 
SZARCH WARRANT 
3o, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATS OS UTAH 
To any Peace Officer in the State of Utah 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having seen made this day before me 
by Detective 3. S. Jensen £64? of the Metropolitan Narcotics Strike 
Force, I am satisfied that thers is probable cause to believe: 
That (I) on the persons) of ("JANS DCS-), ASA -SUE"; BEING 
DESCRIBED AS A FEMALE WHITS ADULT BETWEEN 30 TO 40 TZARS 
OF AGE, BEING OF AVERAGE BUILD AND HEIGHT AND HAVING 
MEDIUM LONG STRAIGHT BLONDS OR LIGHT BROWN HAIR; AND A 
("JOHN DOS") AXA "JIM- or "JOHN" BEING DESCRIBED AS A 
MALE WHITE ADULT BETWEEN 30 TO 40 TZARS OF AGE, BEING CF 
AVERAGE 3UILD AND HEIGHT, WHO HAS A DAR2/GRST 3 SARD AND 
OFTEN WEARS A CAR; BOTH INDIVIDUALS BEING RESIDENTS OF 
THE PREMISES TO BE SEARCHED; 
( } in the vehicle(s) described as 
(2) on the premises known as 1605 SOUTH RICHARDS STREET; 
FURTHER DESCRIBED AS THE SOUTHERNMOST PORTION OF A 
RESIDENTIAL DUPLEX AT THAT ADDRESS; THE DUPLEX BEING 
CONSTRUCTED WITH RED BRICX AND HAVING WHITE TRIM: THE 
NUMBERS 1S0S ARE AFFIZED TO THE RESIDENCE ABOVE THE WEST 
PORCH; TO INCLUDE ALL CONTAINERS, BASEMENTS, ATTICS, 
OUTBUILDINGS AFFIZED OR FREESTANDING CONTAINED THEREON; 
aadLin Che City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
there is now certain property or evidence described as: 
(SEE ATTACHMENT -A") 
A n i D A V I T TOR SEARCH WARRANT/ 
SEARCH WARRANT 
ITEMS TO 3 S SEIZED 
ATTACHMENT "A" 
1 . COCAINE; A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN SOLID OR RCCX FORM, A 
SCHZDULE I I CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
2 . PACKAGING MATERIAL; TO INCLUDE 3UT NOT 3EING LIMITED TO 
SCALES, PLASTIC 2AGS, TAPE. PAPER 3INDLS2 CUT INTO SQUARES. 
3 . DRUG PARAPHERNALIA; TO INCLUDE 3UT NOT BEING LIMITED TO 
SYRINGES, SENT SPOONS, COTTON BALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, 
SHORT STRAWS, PIPES TOR SMCXING OR TU3ES FOR INHALING COCAINE, 
GLASSWARE USED TO MAKE CRACK COCAINE, AND CUT MATERIAL. 
4 . RESIDENCY PAPERS; TO INCLUDE BUT NOT BEING LIMITED TO UTILITY 
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES 
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES. 
5 . U . S . CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE 
NARCOTICS BEING SEARCHED FOR. 
6 . NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS; TO INCLUDE BUT NOT BEING LIMITED TO 
PRICE L I S T , AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, 
FINANCIAL GAIN, AND ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTEDNESS. 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAXS DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE 0? UTAH 
STATE C? UTAH ) 
ss 
C o u n t y o f S a l * Lake J 
AFFIDAVIT FC?. SEAP.CK WARRANT 
3SE0RE: ~f^ K - ^—s/c//As^-? 4 50 South 2nd East 
J U D G E ^ ADDRESS 
The u n d e r s i g n e d a f f i a n t , D e t e c t i v e 3 . H. Jensen £64? of t i e 
M e t r o p o l i t a n N a r c o t i c s S t r i k e Tores , b e i n g f i r s t duly sworn, 
d e p o s e s and s a y s t h a t he has reason to b e l i e v e : 
T h a t (2 ) on t h e p e r s o n ( s ) of CJANE DOE"), AXA 'SUE*; 3EING 
DESCRI3ED AS A FEMALE WHITS ADULT BETWEEN 20 TO 40 TEARS 
OF AGE, BEING 0? AVERAGE BUILD AND HEIGHT AND HAVING 
MEDIUM LONG STRAIGHT 3LCNDE OR LIGHT 3R0WN HAIR; AND A 
(•JOHN DOE") AXA "JIM- or "JOHN" BEING DESCRIBED AS A 
MALE WHITE ADULT 3ETWESN 20 TO 40 TEARS OF AGE, 3EING OF 
AVERAGE BUILD AND HEIGHT, WHO HAS A DARX/GRXT BEARD AND 
OFTEN WEARS A CAP; 30TH INDIVIDUALS 3EING RESIDENTS OF 
THE PREMISES TO BE SEARCHED; 
( ) i n t h e v e h i c l e ( s ) de scr ibed as 
(X) on t h e p r e m i s e s known as 1605 SOUTH RICHARDS STREET; 
FURTHER DESCRI3ED AS THE SOUTHERNMOST PORTION OF A 
RESIDENTIAL DUPLEX AT THAT ADDRESS: THE DUPLEX BEING 
CONSTRUCTED WITH RED BRICX AND HAVING WHITE TRIM; THE 
NUMBERS 1605 ARE AFFIXED TO THE RESIDENCE ABOVE THE WEST 
PORCH; TO INCLUDE ALL CONTAINERS, BASEMENTS, ATTICS, 
OUTBUILDINGS AFFIXED OR FREESTANDING CONTAINED THEREON; 
and i n t h e C i t y of S a l t Lake, County of S a l t Lake, S t a t e of Utah, 
t h e r e i s now c e r t a i n property or ev idence d e s c r i b e d a s : 
(SEE ATTACHMENT "A*} 
A I T I D A V I T FOR SEARCH WARRANT/ 
SEARCH WARRANT 
ITEMS TO BE SEIZED 
ATTACHMENT "A" 
1 . COCAINE; A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN SOLID OR ROCS FORM, A 
SCHEDULE I I CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
2 . PACKAGING MATERIAL; TO INCLUDE 3UT NOT 3EING LIMITED TO 
SCALES, PLASTIC BAGS, TAPE, PAPER SINDLES CUT INTO SQUARES. 
3 . DRUG PARAPHERNALIA; TO INCLUDE 3UT NOT BEING LIMITED TO 
SYRINGES, BENT SPOONS, COTTON BALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, 
SHORT STRAWS, PIPES TOR SMOKING OR TUBES TOR INHALING COCAINE, 
GLASSWARE USED TO MAKE CRACX COCAINE, AND CUT MATERIAL. 
4 . RESIDENCY PAPERS; TO INCLUDE BUT HOT BEING LIMITED TO UTILITY 
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES 
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES. 
5 . U . S . CURRENCY E2LIZVZD TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE 
NAHCOTICS BEING SEARCHED TOR. 
6 . NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS; TO INCLUDE BUT NOT BEING LIMITED TO 
PRICE L I S T , AMOUNTS SCLD, TIMES, DATES, AMCUNTS PURCHASED, 
FINANCIAL GAIN, AND SSPECIALLT DRUG INDEBTEDNESS. 
ATTI3AVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
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and t h a t s a i d p r o p e r t y or e v i d e n c e : 
( 2 ) was u n l a w f u l l y acquired or i s u n l a w f u l l y pos se s sed , or 
( 2 ) has been used to commit or c o n c e a l a p u b l i c o f f e n s e , or 
( 2 ) i s b e i n g p o s s e s s e d with the purpose to use i t as a means 
of commit t ing or c o n c e a l i n g a p u b l i c o f f e n s e , or 
(2 ) c o n s i s t s of an item or c o n s t i t u t e s ev idence of i l l e g a l 
c o n d u c t , p o s s e s s e d by a party to the i l l e g a l conduct, or 
( ) c o n s i s t s of an item or c o n s t i t u t e s ev idence of i l l e g a l 
c o n d u c t , p o s s e s s e d by a person or e n t i t y not a party to 
t h e i l l e g a l conduct [Note requirements of Utah Code 
A n n o t a t e d , 7 7 - 2 3 - 3 ( 2 ) ] . 
A f f i a n t b e l i e v e s t h e property and e v i d e n c e d e s c r i b e d above i s 
e v i d e n c e o f t h e c r i m e ( s ) .of; 
P o s s e s s i o n of a c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e , p o s s e s s i o n of a 
c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e with i n t e n t to d i s t r i b u t e * 
Your a f f i a n t , D e t e c t i v e 3 . H. Jensen , i s c u r r e n t l y ass igned to 
t h e M e t r o p o l i t a n N a r c o t i c s S t r i k e Force , and i s employed by the 
U n i v e r s i t y of Utah P o l i c e Department S p e c i a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s 
D i v i s i o n . Your a f f i a n t has been g iven the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to 
i n v e s t i g a t e c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e ; d i s t r i b u t i o n and p o s s e s s i o n 
o f f e n s e s o c c u r r i n g in S a l t Lake County and surrounding areas . 
Your a f f i a n t has had t r a i n i n g in c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e ( s i 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and in the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of c o n t r o l l e d substance 
r e l a t e d o f f e n s e s . Your a f f i a n t i s a C e r t i f i e d Peace Off icer in the 
S t a t e of Utah, and has over f i v e years of la:/ enforcement 
e x p e r i e n c e . Your a f f i a n t has been a s s i g n e d to n a r c o t i c s 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n s s i n c e J u l y of 1390, and has been ass igned to the 
Metro N a r c o t i c s S t r i k e Force s i n c e October of 1990. Aff iant has 
p e r s o n a l l y purchased and has overseen the purchase of v a r i o u s 
c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e s in r e l a t i o n t o numerous p o l i c e 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . Your a f f i a n t ' s s p e c i a l i z e d t r a i n i n g inc ludes the 
80 hour Drug Enforcement A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Basic Narco t i c s 
I n v e s t i g a t i o n S c h o o l , Utah Peace O f f i c e r s A s s o c i a t i o n Seminars on 
t i l e M a n u f a c t u r e of C o n t r o l l e d S u b s t a n c e s , C l a n d e s t i n e L a b o r a t o r i e s , 
and Drug I n t e r d i c t i o n , and U n i v e r s i t y of Utah P o l i c e De?t . 
s p o n s o r e d i n s e r v i c e t r a i n i n g on drug r e c o g n i t i o n and terminology . 
Your a f f i a n t i s c u r r e n t l y i n v e s t i g a t i n g a complaint r e l a t i n g 
t o an o n g o i n g c o n t r o l l e d substance d i s t r i b u t i o n operat ion be ing 
c o n d u c t e d a t the named premises on t h i s W a r r a n t / A f f i d a v i t . 
ArriDAvir TOR SEARCH WARRA*H 
PAGS 3 
The facts to establish grounds for a Search Warrant are: 
Your affiant has received information from a Confidential 
Reliable Informant (hereafter referred to as "CRI") that persons at 
Che named premises are engaged in the distribution of controlled 
substance(s). 
Your affiant has interviewed CRI and was told by C?.I that CRI 
has purchased cocaine from person(s) that get the cocaine from a 
residence on Richards Street. CRI has told your affiant that the 
unwitting individuals whom CRI has purchased cocaine from get that 
cocaine from a "SUI" and a "JOHN" thai live at the residence to be 
searched. Your affiant has stade controlled purchases of cocaine 
through CRI from unwitting individuals (1 and 21 on several 
occasions, and your affiant has on different occasions seen the 
unwitting individuals enter and exit the residence of L53S Richards 
St. prior to supplying CRI with cocaine. In one instance, C2Z mace 
a controlled purchase of cocaine from an unwitting individual 
(UIS2) who told CRI that UIS2 had to wait m line for the cocaine 
behind another unwitting individual {UIS1J. Surveillance at the 
scene confirmed that the vehicle of UI21 was at the scene and that 
tJISl left the scene around the time that tfl*2 left the scene. CRI 
told your affiant that the unwitting individuals CRI has been 
througn will have the CRI drop them off away from the named 
premises so that CRI would not know which residence they are going 
to. CRI stated that another reason for this is that the s\is-pecZ2 
inside the named premises were trying to be careful of the 
vehicular traffic around their residence for fear that scztoz-t 
might suspect them of narcotics trafficking. CRI stated that the 
suspects in the named residence have asked tneir customers to park 
away from their residence so as not to call attention to them. 
Within the last eight weeks, your affiant with the assistance 
of CRI made a controlled purchase of cocaine from UI21 near the 
named premises. Before the purchase, your affiant searched the CRI 
and the CRI's vehicle for money or contraband and neither was 
found. The CRI was then given a quantity of U.S. currency. Your 
affiant observed the CRI and watched as (II$1 drove up to aeet with 
CRI. Ulirl was driving a vehicle which was registered to JJI±I. CRI 
exchanged the U. S. currency for a package containing suspected 
cocaine. After CRI made the transaction with UISI, your affiant 
fallowed the CRI to a location where CRI and CRI's vehicle were 
searched again for money or contraband. At that time CRI turned 
over to your affiant a package containing a substance which later 
field tested positively as cocaine. CRI told your affiant that the 
deal was done near the named premises because UI£L had to obtain 
the cocaine from the named premises prior to UI*L delivering it to 
CRI. Your affiant maintained control of the evidence and booked it 
into the Salt Lake Police evidence. This substance was later 
analyzed by the State Cnae Lab and v/as found to be cocaine. 
ArriDAvxr roa SIAHCH WAHHANT 
BAGS 4 
Within che last two weeks, your affianc with che assistance of 
CHI made a concroiied purchase of cocaine from che premises named 
on this Warrant/Affidavit. Eefore che purchase, your affianc 
searched che CHI and che CHI's vehicle for money or concrahand and 
neither was found. The CHI was Chen given a quancicy of U.S. 
currency. The CHI was aionitcred and concroiied as che CHI aec wich 
UIS2. CHI was followed by a surveillance ceam co a locacion where 
CHI dropped off CJIS2. From chac poinc, UIS2 wenc direcciy co che 
named premises. This was confirmed by surveillance ac che scene. 
A shore cime following, UI22 was observed exiting che named 
premises and enrouce co CHI's locacion. Your affianc observed HIS2 
meet wich CHI, and from chac pome CHI and UIS2 were followed unci! 
CHI dropped off UIS2. Your affianc and CHI chen wenc direcciy co 
a locacion were che CHI and che CHI's vehicle were searched again 
for money or concraband. Ac chac cime CHI turned over co your 
affianc a package concaining a subscance which lacer field cesced 
positively as cocaine. Your affianc maintained control of che 
evidence and booked ic inco che Sale Lake Police evidence. Scene 
surveillance during chis concroiied purchase witnessed CJISl exit 
the named premises minutes prior to QIS2 exiting the named 
premises. The scene surveillance team Chen wicnessed UISI leave 
-che area in che same vehicle as (IISi had used previously co deliver 
cocaine to CHI. 
Within che iasc seventy cwo hours, your affianc wich che 
assistance of CHI made a concroiied purchase of cocaine from che 
premises named on chis Warranc/Affidavic. 3efore che purchase, 
your affianc searched che CHI and cr.e CHI's venicie :ar aor.ey or 
contraband and neither was found. The CHI was Cher, giver, a 
quantity of U.S. currency. The CHI was momcored and concroiied as 
the CHI mec with UIS1. CHI was controlled as che CHI wenc directly 
co a locacion where CHI dropped off UI*I. Hcnier.cs lacer, scene 
surveillance observed UIS1 entering che named premises. A short 
time following, HI SI was observed exiting che named premises and 
enroute to CHI's location. Your affianc observed 01*1 meec wich 
CHI, and from chac point CHI and 01 SI were followed until CHI 
dropped off UIS1. Your affiant and CHI then went direcciy to a 
location were the CHI and the CHI's vehicle were searched again for 
money or contraband. At that time CHI turned over to your affianc 
a package containing a subscance which lacer field cesced 
positively as cocaine. Your affiant maintained control of che 
evidence and booked ic into che Sale Lake Police evidence. 
Your affianc believes chac che premises should be searched for 
packaging material. Affianc knows from experience and training 
that these items are an inherent pare of concroiied subscance 
distribution operations and are needed to maintain an ongoing 
enterprise, as the substances distributed tnusc always leave che 
premises in a container of some kind. Also these items are 
consistently found during the execution of narcotics search warrants. 
AJTIDAVIT ?0R SEARCH WARRANT 
?AGS S 
Your a f f i a n t b e l i e v e s t h a t the named premises should be 
s e a r c h e d f o r drug p a r a p h e r n a l i a . A f f i a n t knows from t r a i n i n g and 
e x p e r i e n c e t h a t t h e s e i t e m s are c o n s i s t e n t l y found on premises 
where c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e search warrants have been served. 
Your a f f i a n t b e l i e v e s the p r e m i s e s should be searched f a r 
r e c o r d s o f c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e ( s ) d i s t r i b u t i o n . Tour a f f i a n t 
knows from p a s t e x e c u t i o n of numerous c o n t r o l l e d substance search 
w a r r a n t s t h a t s u s p e c t s o f t e n keep such r e c o r d s to show d a t e s , 
t i m e s , amounts p u r c h a s e d , who purchased , f i n a n c i a l ga in , and 
e s p e c i a l l y drug i n d e b t e d n e s s . Your a f f i a n t b e l i e v e s that t i e 
p r e m i s e s s h o u l d a l s o be searched f o r records of r e s i d e n c y and 
o w n e r s h i p of the p r e m i s e s and any p r o p e r t y s e a r c h e d . 
Your a f f i a n t c o n s i d e r s the i n f o r m a t i o n r e c e i v e d from the 
C o n f i d e n t i a l Informant r e l i a b l e b e c a u s e : 
CRI has g i v e n your a f f i a n t CRI's proper name, address , and 
phone number. CRI has made s t a t e m e n t s to your a f f i a n t a g a i n s t 
C R I ' s own p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t . In format ion g i v e n to your a f f i a n t by 
CRI r e g a r d i n g the f a c t t h a t CRI's s u p p l i e r s o b t a i n t h e i r coca ine 
from a r e s i d e n c e on R i c h a r d s S t r e e t has been s u b s t a n t i a t e d by the 
f a c t t h a t your a f f i a n t has mace c o n t r o l l e d purchases of coca ine 
from 1505 South R i c h a r d s S t r e e t . CRI has g i v e n your a f f i a n t the 
i d e n t i t i e s of both III Si and UIS2 and both i n d i v i d u a l s have cr imina l 
r e c o r d s i n v o l v i n g c o n t r o l l e d subs tance o f f e n s e s . Tour a f f i a n t has 
p r e v i o u s l y worked wi th CRI on e t h e r c o n t r o l l e d substance 
d i s t r i b u t i o n c a s e s where c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e s have been purchased 
by CRI i n c o n t r o l l e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s monitored by your a f f i a n t , and 
y o u r a f f i a n t i s p r e s e n t l y i n v e s t i g a t i n g o t h e r c o n t r o l l e d substance 
d i s t r i b u t i o n o p e r a t i o n s with tne a s s i s t a n c e of CRI. CRI i s 
c o o p e r a t i n g i n t h e s e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s of CRI's own f r e e w i l l , not i n 
o r d e r t o work o f f any c r i m i n a l c h a r g e s . 
Your a f f i a n t a s k s t h e Court not to r e q u i r e your a f f i a n t to 
r e v e a l t h e name of CRI f o r f ear of p h y s i c a l r e t a l i a t i o n by the 
s u s p e c t ( s ) or u n w i t t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s i n v o l v e d in t h i s case or by any 
o f t h e i r c r i m i n a l a s s o c i a t e s . Threa t s of p h y s i c a l harm a g a i n s t 
i n d i v i d u a l s thought to be c o n f i d e n t i a l in formants are commonplace. 
A l s o , CRI i s c u r r e n t l y b e i n g used i n o t h e r ongoing i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . 
Your a f f i a n t f e a r s t h a t i f the CRI's i d e n t i t y were made known, 
p e n d i n g i n v e s t i g a t i o n s and f u r t h e r use of CRI would be j eopard ized . 
Your a f f i a n t a l s o a s k s the Court not to r e q u i r e your a f f i a n t to 
r e v e a l t h e e x a c t d a t e s , t i m e s , or amounts of c o c a i n e purchased for 
f e a r i t c o u l d r e a d i l y i d e n t i f y the u n w i t t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s u s e d , 
t h e r e b y i d e n t i f y i n g the CRI. 
ATTIDAVIT TOR SEARCH WARRANT 
PAGZ 6 
Your affiant has verified the above information from the 
Confidential Informant to be correct and accurate through the 
following independent investigation: 
Information on 1605 South Richards Street being involved in 
the distribution of controlled substances has been received 
independently of your affiants cases involving CRI. In January, 
Metro Narcotics received an Intelligence Report from a Concerned 
Citizen (CC£1) whom lives near 1S05 South Richards Street. CCS1 at 
that time stated that there was heavy vehicular and pedestrian 
traffic to and around 1S0S S. Richards St., and that those people 
visiting the named premises would only stay for a very short tine. 
CCS1 stated that often people will park around the corner and walk 
to the premises. This has been confirmed by the fact that 
unwitting individuals always make CRI drop them off of Richards St. 
so that the unwitting individuals can walk to the residence. CCS1 
told your affiant that a "SUI" . lives at the residence of 1535 
Richards with her husband and tvo teenage daughters. 
Your affiant spoke with another concerned citizen who 
requested to remain anonymous who told your affiant that a "SUI* 
and possibly a "JIM* are the people that live in the named 
premises. 
SUI is described as a female white adult, possibly between 20 
zo 40 years of age, being of average build and height approximately 
S'5", and having medium long straight blond or light brown hair. 
"JIM" or "JCKlf (SUI's apparent live in boyfriend or husband) is 
described as a male white adult, possibly between 20 to 40 years of 
age, being of average build and height, who has a dark/gray beard 
and often wears a cap. 
Your affiant considers the information received from the Concerned 
Citizen reliable because: 
CCS1 has supplied your affiant with CCSl's proper name, 
address, and phone number. CC21 complained on this case because of 
CC^l's concern for CCSl's neighborhood and community. CCS1 is 
supplying this information of CCSl's own free will, not in order to 
work off any criminal charges. 
Your affiant asks the Court not to require your affiant to 
reveal the name of CCS1 for fear of physical retaliation by the 
suspect(s) or unwitting individuals involved in this case or by any 
of their criminal associates. Further, your affiant fears that 
making known the identities of concerned citizens whom notify the 
police about suspicious activities would discourage further 
community involvement in police investigations. 
ATriDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BAGS 7 
Tour affiant has had thlilWarrant/^^fidavit reviewed by Deputy Salt 
Lake County Attorney fOJe \/\dr\)r^c^l\ and the Warrant/ 
Affidavit: has been approved for presentation to tie Court. 
WHSRSZORS, tiie affiant prays tiiat a Search Warrant be issued for 
tiie seizure of said items: 
( ) in the daytime. 
(2) at any time day or night because there is reason to 
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior to it 
being concealed, damaged, destroyed, or altered, or for 
other goad reasons to-wit: 
Your affiant knows from training and experience that suspects 
distributing controlled substances such as cocaine do not maintain 
Tegular business hours. Your affiant has in fact made controlled 
purchases from the named premises during the evening hours. 
Your affiant has been to the named premises and believes that 
tiie safest time for the officers to make approach to the listed 
premises is during tiie hours of darkness. Your affiant also firmly 
believes that it is always safer for ail involved if the officers 
are allowed the safety of the cover of darkness and no-knock entry 
for tiie execution of controlled substance search warrants. 
It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer(s) 
executing the requested Warrant not be required to give notice of 
tiie officer's authority or purpose because: 
(1) physical harm may result to any person if notice were 
given, or 
(2) the property sought may be quickly destroyed, diseased 
of, or secreted. 
This danger is believed to exist because: 
Your affiant has learned through this investigation that the 
suspects in this case have gone to great lengths to avoid detection 
by the police. CHI has told your affiant that the suspects only 
allow a select group of customers to their residence, and that in 
some cases when the suspects feel that things are getting "too 
hot", the suspects will withdraw permission for some customers to 
come to the suspect premises. CHI also told your-affiant that it 
is at the behest of the suspects in this case that customers are 
made to park away from the named premises. 
Your affiant knows from experience and training and the past 
execution of numerous controlled substance search warrants that 
AxIIDAVIT TOR SEARCH WARRANT 
PACK a 
more and more narcot i c s t r a f f i c k e r s are araing themselves to 
p r o t e c t themselves and t h e i r supply from other narcotics u s e r s . 
Based on your a f f i a n t ' s t ra in ing and experience, suspects often use 
f a r c e i n r e s i s t i n g the serv ice of narcot ic s search warrants. Tour 
a f l i a i v c has heea aa aumecaus a a r c a t i c s search warrants where 
s u s p e c t s have had firearms r e a d i l y ava i lab le for the ir use. Your 
a f f i a n t b e l i e v e s that i f n o t i c e were given by o f f i c e r s , the 
s u s p e c t ( s ) would attempt to f l e e , f lush the cocaine, or procure a 
weapon and someone would be injured . Your af f iant be l ieves i t i s 
a lways s a f e r for a l l persons , o f f i c e r s , subjects and non-
p a r t i c i p a n t s i f the o f f i c e r s have the sa fe ty of no-knock entry. 
ATII; 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE HS 
t h i s day of v t Q O ! 
JUDC2 I3-^TaZ\ THZ23 C;2S^Z: 
CCU37, r.I A>TO 13?. r~Z\COUNTY 0: 
SALT LAXZ, STATS OF UTAH 
